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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

Bills and Notes-Checks--Burden and Manner of Proving
Loss Caused Drawer by Delay in Presentment
In a recent case the defendant, drawer, gave his check to one McDaniels who had not presented the check for payment when the
drawee bank closed its doors because of insolvency thirteen days later.
The endorsee of the check brought action on it. The drawer demurred claiming the delay in presentment discharged him. The lower
court sustained the demurrer. Reversed, on the ground that the defendant should not only show delay in order to be excused but also
a loss.'
The frequent failures of banks at the present time make the
question a very important one, since most of the causes of loss by
unreasonable delay arises through failure of the drawee banks. 2
Since the general rule applicable to bills of exchange, "that presentment is sufficient to charge the secondary parties, if made within
a reasonable time from the last negotiation thereof"8 has no application to the liability of the drawer of a check, to whom a special rule
of liability is laid down, 4 no question concerning the liability of the
drawer is raised, in the instant case, by the negotiation from the payee
to Mrs. McDaniel.5
Reasonable Time for Presentment
In order to preserve his rights against the drawer of a check the
holder must present it for payment to the drawee within a reasonable
time, or in case of loss caused thereby the drawer is discharged to the
'McDaniel v. Mackey, 150 S. E. 439 (Ga. 1929).
'Carroll v. Sweet, 128 N. Y. 19, 27 N. E. 763 (1891) ; Gordon v. Levine,
194 Mass. 418, 80 N. E. 505, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1153 (1907); Palmer v.
Harris, 142 S.E. 276 (Ga. 1928). A rather unusual case is presented by Ferrari
v. First Nat'l Bank of Connesville, Pa., 159 N. E. 178 (N. Y. 1927) where the
drawer had no funds in the drawee, but the drawee bank agreed to cash the
check and charge against the account of a bank in which the drawer did have
funds, and the failure of this latter bank coupled with delay in presentment
was held to excuse the drawer.
'N. I. L. §70; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann (1919) §3051.
"'N.I. L. §186; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §3168: A check must be
presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer
is discharged to the extent of his loss caused by the delay.
'The indorser is discharged by unreasonable delay in presenting the check
regardless of the loss. And in this case the check must be presented for payament by the close of the business day following its delivery to the endorsee.
Comer v. Dufour, 95 Ga. 376, 22 S.E. 543 (1895); Mauney v. Coit, 80 N. C.
.300, 30 Am. Rep. 80 (1879) ; Kirkpatrick v. Puryear, 93 Tenn. 409, 24 S. W.
1130 (1894); Nuzum v. Sheppard, 87 W. Va. 243, 104 S.E. 587, 11 A. L,R.
1024 (1920).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
extent of that loss.8 Where the check is drawn on a local bank the
check must be presented to the drawee bank for payment by the close
of the next business day following receipt of it by the payee, in the
absence of special circumstances.7
"N. I. L. §186; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §3168, supra note 4; Carroll
v. Sweet, sup-a note 2; Krauss v. Aleck, 209 N. W. 444 (Iowa 1926); Swift
& Co. v. Miller, 62 Ind. App. 312, 113 N. E. 447 (1916); Hazard Bank and
Trust Co. v. Morgan, 211 Ky. 137, 277 S. W. 307 (1925) ; Merritt v. Gate City
Nat'l Bank, 100 Ga. 147, 27 S. E. 979 (1897); Koch v. Sandford Loan and
Realty Co., 286 S. W. 732 (Mo. 1926).
'First Nat'l Bank of Charlotte v. Alexander, 84 N. C. 30 (1883); Lewis,
Hubbard & Co. v. Montgomery Supply Co., 59 W. Va. 75, 52 S. E. 1017, 4
L. R. A. (N. S.) 132 (1906); Colwell v. Colwell, 92 Ore. 103, 179 Pac. 916,
4 A. L. R. 876 (1919) ; Gordon v. Levine, supra note 2.
However, when the holder has knowledge of the shaky condition of the
drawee there are some jurisdictions which say the holder must present the
check at the earliest time possible. Temple v. Carroll, 75 Neb. 61, 105 N. W.
989 (1905); First Nat'l Bank of Charlotte v. Alexander, supra note 7, approved in First Nat'l Bank of Kewanee v. Wine, 47 BANKxES LAw JoUaNAL
220 (II. App. 1930).
If the drawee is located in another city or town from that in -which the
holder resides a different rule for presentment is laid down and the check
must be sent by some usual means of communication on the day following its
receipt for collection and the party who finally receives it for collection must
present it to the drawee by the close of the business day following its receipt
by him. Thus two days are allowed for each step in the chain of collection.
Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Montgomery Supply Co., 59 W. Va. 75, 52 S. E.
1017 (1906). And no bank in the chain of collection is chargeable with negligence if it forwards the check on to the next bank by the close of the business
day following its receipt. Wallace v. City Nat'l Bank, 202 Ala. 323, 80 So.
405 (1918) ; Douchester v. Merchant's Nat'l Bank of Houston, 106 Tex. 201,
163 S. W. 5 (1914); Plover Savings Bank v. Moodie, 135 Iowa 685, 110 N. W.
29 (1906). However, it seems that the next day rule should be straightened
in one place. It seems only right that the intermediate banks in the chain of
collection should mail the paper on to the next bank in the chain on the day
of its receipt, unless it is received after the close of business hours. In fact
some banks in Philadelphia, Chicago and Kansas City advertise that they maintain 24 hour transit departments. But it should not be supposed that sending
the check on to another bank, no matter where it was, would satisfy the duty
of the collecting bank. It has been considered unreasonable delay to send the
check from, or across, the place of payment, instead of toward, or to it. Gifford v. Hardell, 88 Wis. 538, 60 N. W. 1064 (1894). This does not mean that
the check must be sent in a line that a bird would fly, but merely by the usual
commercial route. Sublette Exch. Bank v. Fitzgerald, 168 Ill. App. 240 (1912).
This allows evidence as to the custom of banks to be put in to show the reasonableness of a route. But even custom will not justify the choosing of an
absurd route. The Federal Reserve System has diminished the importance of
this point and in all probability the routing of the Federal Reserve will be held
free from negligence.
Two rather unusual cases of circuitous routing were: Where the payee sent
a local check across Chicago to another bank which was not a member of the
clearing house instead of presenting to the drawee as he might have reasonably
done. And when the check was delayed in reaching the drawee, which had
failed in the meantime, the drawer was discharged. National Plumbing and
Heating Co. v. Stevenson, 213 Ill. App. 49 (1918). And where the local agent
of a firm -was given a check and instead of presenting the same for payment
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Where the check is deposited in a local bank other than the
drawee most jurisdictions refuse to allow extra time for collection
through the clearing house, and hold that the check must still reach
the drawee by the close of the next business day following receipt by
the payee, 8 but some jurisdiction properly recognize the custom and
demands of present day business and allow an extra day in such
cases.9 "Checks are not designed for circulation as mediums of
exchange or credit but as cash items for immediate payment and so
should be presented with all dispatch and diligence consistent with
attendant circumstances."' 10
A failure to make presentment within the time stated is prima
facie a case of failure to make presentment within a reasonable
time." And according to the majority view these facts coupled with
the failure of the drawee will be prima facie a case of loss to the
drawer, since he is presumed to draw his checks against sufficient
funds to pay them. However, these facts will not preclude a finding,
under facts peculiar to a particular case, that a longer delay was in
fact reasonable.' 2 In determining what is a reasonable time in a parhe sent it on to headquarters and the check did not reach the drawee for nearly
a week, it having failed before presentment, the drawer was discharged. Republic Metalware Co. v. Smjth, 218 Ill. App. 130 (1920).
'Grange v. Reigh, 93 Wis. 552, 67 N. W. 1130 (1896); Carroll v. Sweet,
supra note 2; Kirkpatrick v. Puryear, supra note 5; Smith v. Miller, 43 N. Y.
171 (1870); Edminstein v. Herpolsheimer Co., 66 Neb. 94, 92 N. W. 138, 59
L. R. A. 934 (1901) ; Alexander v. Burchfield, 7 Man'& G 1061, 135 Eng. Rep.
431 (1842).
'Loux v. Fox, 171 Pa. 63, 33 Atl. 190 (1895); Willis v. Finley, 173 Pa. 28,
34 Atl. 213 (1895) ; Bristline v. Bentling, 39 Idaho 534, 228 Pac. 309 (1924).
" Gordon v. Levine, supra note 2; Kennedy v. Jones, 140 Ga. 302, 78 S. E.
1069 (1913); First Nat'l Bank of Wymore v. Miller, 37 Neb. 500, 55 N. W.
1064 (1893).
'Pelt v. Marlar, 95 Ark. 111, 128 S.W. 554 (1910).
"Such matters have been held to excuse a longer delay: Request by the
drawer that the check not be presented immediately. Pollard it. Bowen, 57
Ind. 232 (1897); Tarasek v. Koscuiszko Bldg. & L. Assn., 218 Ill.
App. 487
(1920). Lack of funds in the drawer's account to meet the check. Emory v.
Hobson, 63 Me. 32 (1873) ; Bodner v. Rotman, 95 N. J. Eq. 910, 123 Atl. 529
(1924). Even if the funds are withdrawn after a reasonable time for presentment has expired this will still prevent the drawer from being discharged.
Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Hatworth, 296 Fed. 339 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924).
Sudden and severe illness of such severeness as to prevent the holder from
securing an agent to present. Wilson v. Senier, 14 Wis. 380 (1861). Other
cases excusing delay: Joerns Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Burns, 173 Minn. 389, 217 N. W.
506 (1928); Coxe v. Boone, 8 W. Va. 500 (1875).
By reason of the special statute concerning them it was held that a railroad
was not forced to present a check received for hauling goods -promptly to keep
from discharging the drawer. Fullerton v. Chicago M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 36
F. (2d) 180 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
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-ticular case regard must be had to the nature of the instrument, the
usage or custom of trade or business (if any) both with respect to
such instrument and also to the facts of the particular case. 13 Ordinarily this will be a question for the jury in each case. 14
Burden of Proving Loss by Delay
Assuming the unreasonable delay, the further question arises as
to whether the drawer must sustain the burden of proof upon the
issue of loss as a defense, and show loss to himself, or whether the
holder must negative the loss in order to recover.
All courts agree that if the payee puts the check in evidence and
proves the drawer's signature he is entitled to recover, if nothing else
appears,' 5 and force the drawer wishing to rely on delayed presentment as a defense to prove the unreasonable delay.' 6 But on the next
In the case of accepting checks for taxes under somewhat similar statutes
requiring cash for payment, Palmer v. Harris, supra note 2, said that delay in
jpresentment made the check becojne final payment to the extent of the drawer's
loss. But Moritz v. Nicholson, Tax Collector, 141 Miss. 531, 106 So. 762
(1926) held that unreasonable delay in such cases did not discharge the drawer
as this could only be done by actual payment.
N. I. L. §193; N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §2978; McFadden v. Keesee,
16 S.W. (2d) 994 (Ark. 1929) ; Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Goodman,
292 S. W. 659 (Ark. 1927). Yates v. Goodwin, 96 Me. 90, 51 Atl. 804 (1901).
When the drawer has a check certified and sent to the payee as a general rule
it seems that this will not extend the time for presentment of the check, nor
will it affect the rights of the parties. Blake v. Hamilton Dime Savings Bank
Co., 79 Ohio St. 189, 87 N. E. 73, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 290, 16 Ann. Cas. 210
(1908) ; Blair & Hoge v. Wilson, 69 Va, 165 (1877). City of Brunswick v.
Peoples Savings Bank, 194 Mo. App. 360, 190 S.W. 60 (1916). Contra: in
Smith v. Hubbard, 205 Mich. 44, 171 N. W. 546 (1919), it was held that certification of a check by the drawer extended the time of presentment as in this
condition the check became more of the nature of currency. But certification
by the holder discharges the drawer at once without delay or loss since the
holder substitutes the banks credit for that of the drawer. Met. Nat'l Bank v.
Jones, 137 Ill. 634, 27 N. E. 533, 12 L. R. A. 492 (1891). As to cashier's
checks and drafts the time for presentment varies with the circumstances.
Lloyd Manufacturing Co. v. Davies, 51 N. D. 336, 199 N. W. 869, 36 A. L. R.
465 (1924).
"Tomlin v. Thorton, 99 Ga. 585, 27 S.E. 147 (1896) ; Empire Arizona Copiper Co. v. Shaw, 20 Ariz. 471, 181 Pac. 464 (1919) ; Gordon v. Levine, supra
note 2; Sinclair Refining Co. v. KXith, 97 Okla. 55, 221 Pac. 1003 (1924). But
if the facts are undisp~uted, or are such that no reasonable man could differ
concerning them, it.bcdomes a question of law for the court. Bristline v. Bentling, .rpranote 9; Nuzum v. Shepard, supra note 5.
"Cook v. Moecher, 217 I!.App. 479- (1920) ; Stull v. Daniel Machine Co.,
207 Ala. 544, 93 So. 583" (1923.); Jones v. Bank of Powder Springs, 31 Ga.
App. 263, 120 S.E. 422 (1923). Of 6ourse in North Carolina since we do not
have a directed verdict for the 'one sustaining the burden of proof the judge
would merely charge the jury that if they believed the evidence that they might
find for the plaintiff.
" Hazard Bank -and- Trust Co. v. Morgan, 211 Ky. 137, 277' S. W. 307
(1925); Bodner v.Rodman, supra note 12; Coldwell v. Coldwell, supra note
7: Gordon v. Levine, supra note 2.
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issue we find a split of authority. 17 Georgia and other jurisdictions,

require the defendant to go further and prove that the delay caused
him loss.' 8 Another group place the burden upon the drawer to prove
loss unless it is shown that the drawee bank has become insolvent, in
which event they recognize a prima fade case of loss, thus forcing
the holder to negative that loss in order to recover.' 9 A third group
merely require that the drawer prove unreasonable delay, and this
being done the holder must come forward and negative the loss to the
20
drawer or suffer an adverse verdict.

But it seems in theory at least that the two latter groups are in
error. The more equitable result would be reached by having the

drawer sustain the burden of proving both the unreasonable delay and
also the loss. Where no failure of the bank is shown the mere proof

of non presentation of the check within a reasonable time does not
raise any natural inference that a final loss has been or will be, suffered by the drawer. 21 And where we have the insolvency of the

drawee bank shown, while this may cause a natural inference of some
loss to the drawer, still it does not cause a natural inference of total
loss. 22 And since the drawer is only discharged to the extent of his.
,' It is commonly stated that the weight of authority places the burden of
disproving loss to the drawer on the holder in order for the holder to recover
after delayed presentment and failure of the drawee bank is shown, but if such
is the truth it exists by an exceedingly narrow margin.
However, all agree that loss to the drawer must be shown in some manner
and it is no defense that there has been loss without delay, or delay without
loss. It has been held that no delay short of the statute of limitations wilt
discharge the drawer without loss. Coldwell v. Coldwell, upra note 7; Harzard Bank and Trust Co. v. Morgan, supra note 6.
'Merritt v. Gate City Nat'l Bank, supra note 6; Rosenbaum v. Hazard, 23
Pa. 206, 82 Ati. 62 (1911) ; Sims v. Hunter, 258 Pac. 550 (Idaho 1927) ; Empire Arizona Copper Co. v. Shaw, supra note 14; Cox v. Citizens State Bank,
73 Kan. 789, 85 Pac. 762 (1906). Anchor Duck Mills v. Harp, 150 S. E. 57Z
(Ga. App. 1929). For case where action is brought on the original consideration instead of the check see McEwen v. Cobb, 104 Misc. Rep. 477, 172 N. Y.
S.44 (1914).
"Willetts v. Paine, 43 Ill. 433 (1867) ; Watt v. Gans, 114 Ala. 264; 21 So.
1011 (1897) ; Hamlin v. Simpson, 75 Iowa 125, 74 N. W. 906 (1898) ; Little v.
Phenix Bank, 2 Hill 425 (N. Y. 1842) ; Kirkpatrick v. Puryear, supra note 5.
" Griffin v. Kemp, 46 Ind. 172; McLain v. Lowther, 35 W. Va. 297, 13 S. E.
1003 (1892).
Indeed he may be financially benefited in case of an account which draws
interest on average daily balances.
" In the case of 105 insolvent national banks whose affairs were wound up
in the year ending October 31, 1929, dividends paid to the creditors ranged
from only one per cent to 111.5 per cent (principal and interest). The receiverships lasted from one to seven years. REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CuManNcY (1929) 26-27.
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loss, it seems more reasonable that one seeking to apply a statute
favorable to his cause should sustain the burden of proving that loss.
Manner of Proving Loss by Delay
But regardless of who sustains the burden of proof on the question of loss there still remains the problem as to the manner of determining its extent. At the date of the trial no one knows accurately
what it will be, since these actions are usually brought just after the
failure of the bank and it may not be known for several years what
will be paid, though the receiver may give an opinion. 28 Most cases
have ignored the question as to the extent of the loss entirely and
seem to have assumed that if loss could be shown at all it would be
presumed to be total. 24 In the few cases deciding the point the rule
has been to leave the question to the jury to determine the loss, without any adequate evidence to aid them, and their verdicts seem to
have been only a guess.2 5 This is in part the fault of counsel but
since the difficulty inheres in the nature of the case some other
method of dealing with check-loss cases might be suggested.
1. The case might be tried only to the extent of determining
whether the delay was or was not unreasonable, and if it was found
that the delay was unreasonable, the case might then be continued
until liquidation was complete, thus removing the necessity of a jury
verdict on the question of loss. 20
2. Judgment might be given for the holder for the whole amount
of the check with a stay of execution allowing the drawer to satisfy
the judgment by paying over to the holder whatever amount he should
later receive on this portion of his deposit in the liquidation pro27

ceedings.

Supra note 22.

"Hamlin v. Simpson, srupra note 19; C;mpbell v. Shark, 267 Pac. 458
(Idaho 1926); Kling Bros. v. Whipps, 123 Okla. 253, 270 Pac. 79 (1927);
Commercial Investment Co. v.Lundgren-Witternsten Co., 173 Minn. 83, 216
N. W. 531 (1928) ; Northern Lumber Co.v.Clausen, 201 Iowa 701, 208 N. W.
72 (1926).
Courtney v.McCartney, 30 Mo.183 (1865) ; Fergus Motor Co. v.Blackweilder, 260 Pac. 734 (Idaho 1926) ; see also Merritt v.Gate City Nat'l Bank,
supra note 6; Hamlin v.Simpson, supra note 19.
'The objections to this plan lieinthe fact that this will necessitate the
drawer giving a bond to reimburse the holder at the later date and itwould
involve also the question of whether the holder could be constitutionally deprived of his right to have the jury assess the damages at once,ifhe so desired.
' This arrangement too would require a bond ifthe plaintiff were properly
protected, and the premium on such bonds whether assessed on plaintiff or
dependent would seem to -bean undesirable expense of the adjustment between
the parties.
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3. The court might render judgment for the holder for the whole
amount of the check with leave to the drawer to satisfy it -by assigning to the holder a portion of his deposit claim against the drawee
bank equal to the amount of the check which has been dishonored.
By this plan the case would be finally disposed of at once, and the
amount of the plaintiff's recovery would be determined with mathematical accuracy. The loss which the plaintiff stood to suffer would
be the exact amount intended by the Negotiable Instruments Law.
And as the rule would have all the merits of speed and simplicity, it
would seem a desirable substitute for jury guesses. The innovation
23
might be put in force by a statute.
HENRY

T. POWELL.

Carriers-Allowance of Set-Off Against Freight Charges
A shipper, sued for freight charges, attempted to set off damages
arising from negligence and delay in shipment. A federal District
Court held that he was not entitled to plead set-off.1
Defendant shipped grapes over plaintiff's line. Plaintiff delivered
without collecting freight and brought suit for the charges. Defendant set up loss due to delay and negligent handling and asked for a
set-off which was allowed by the United States Supreme Court.2
The problem might be solved by an amendment adding the following to

§186 of the N. I. L.: "Provided, however, that when such check is found not
to have been presented within a reasonable time, and the drawer had the right

at the time of presentment, as between himself and the drawee, to have the
check paid, the drawer shall be entitled to be fully discharged from liability
thereon -by assigning to the holder thereof the portion of his claim against
the drawee equal to the amount of the check."
This is somewhat similar to §74 of the English Bills of Exchange Act,
which after stating, in effect, §186 of the N. I. L., adds: "The holder of such
check as to which such drawer or person is discharged, shall be a creditor, in
lieu of such drawer or person, of such banker, to the extent of such discharge,
and entitled to recover the amount from him."
This result may possibly be reached without an enabling statute by judicial
decree at the time of trial. See Hawes v. Blackwell, 107 N. C. 196, 12 S. E. 245
(1890). However, constitutional objections might well be raised against such
procedure.
There might be some ground for extending the language of the amendment above proposed to include also domiciled demand notes. See Note (1930)

8 N. C. L. REv. 184.
'Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Carl & W. J. Piowaty, Inc., 36 F. (2d) 604 (N. D.
Ill. 1929).
1 Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Lindell, 50 Sup. Ct. 200 (1930).

